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Abstract Studies accumulate over time and meta-analyses are mainly retrospec-
tive. These two characteristics introduce dependencies between the analysis time,
at which a series of studies is up for meta-analysis, and results within the series.
Dependencies introduce bias — Accumulation Bias — and invalidate the sampling
distribution assumed for p-value tests, thus inflating type-I errors. But dependen-
cies are also inevitable, since for science to accumulate efficiently, new research
needs to be informed by past results. Here, we investigate various ways in which
time influences error control in meta-analysis testing. We introduce an Accumula-
tion Bias Framework that allows us to model a wide variety of practically occurring
dependencies, including study series accumulation, meta-analysis timing, and ap-
proaches to multiple testing in living systematic reviews. The strength of this frame-
work is that it shows how all dependencies affect p-value-based tests in a similar
manner. This leads to two main conclusions. First, Accumulation Bias is inevitable,
and even if it can be approximated and accounted for, no valid p-value tests can
be constructed. Second, tests based on likelihood ratios withstand Accumulation
Bias: they provide bounds on error probabilities that remain valid despite the bias.
We leave the reader with a choice between two proposals to consider time in error
control: either treat individual (primary) studies and meta-analyses as two separate
worlds — each with their own timing — or integrate individual studies in the meta-
analysis world. Taking up likelihood ratios in either approach allows for valid tests
that relate well to the accumulating nature of scientific knowledge. Likelihood ratios
can be interpreted as betting profits, earned in previous studies and invested in new
ones, while the meta-analyst is allowed to cash out at any time and advise against
future studies.
Keywords
meta-analysis, accumulation bias, sequential, cumulative,
living systematic review, likelihood ratio, research waste,
evidence-based research
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1 Introduction
Meta-analysis refers to the statistical synthesis
of results from a series of studies. [...] the syn-
thesis will be meaningful only if the studies have
been collected systematically. [...] The formulas
used in meta-analysis are extensions of formulas
used in primary studies, and are used to address
similar kinds of questions to those addressed in
primary studies. –Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins
& Rothstein (2009, pp. xxi-xxiii)
To consult the statistician after an experiment is
finished is often merely to ask him to conduct a
post mortem examination. He can perhaps say
what the experiment died of. –Fisher (1938, p.
18)
These two quotes conflict. Most meta-analyses are retro-
spective and consider the number of studies available —
after the literature has been searched systematically — as
a given for the statistical analysis. P-value based statistical
tests, however, are intended to be prospective and require
the sample size — or the stopping rule that produces the
sample — to be set specifically for the planned statistical
analysis. The second quote, by the p-value’s popularizer
Ronald Fisher, is about primary studies. But this prospec-
tive rationale influences meta-analysis as well because it
also involves the size of the study series: p-value tests as-
sume that the number of studies — so the timing of the
meta-analysis — is predetermined or at least unrelated
to the study results. So by using p-value methods, con-
ventional meta-analysis implicitly assumes that promising
initial results are just as likely to develop into (large) se-
ries of studies as their disappointing counterparts. Con-
clusive studies should just as likely trigger meta-analyses
as inconclusive ones. And so the use of p-value tests sug-
gests that results of earlier studies should be unknown
when planning new studies as well as when planning
meta-analyses. Such assumptions are unrealistic and ac-
tively argued against by the Evidence-Based Research Net-
work (Lund et al., 2016) part of the movement to reduce
research waste (Chalmers and Glasziou, 2009; Chalmers
et al., 2014). But ignoring these assumptions invalidates
conventional p-value tests and inflates type-I errors.
P-values are based on tail areas of a test statistic’s sam-
pling distribution under the null hypothesis, and thus re-
quire this distribution to be fully specified. In this paper
we show that the standard normal Z-distribution gener-
ally assumed (e.g. Borenstein et al. (2009)) is not an
appropriate sampling distribution. Moreover, we believe
that no sampling distribution can be specified that fully
represents the variety of processes in accumulating scien-
tific knowledge and all decision made along the way. We
need a more flexible approach to testing that controls er-
rors regardless of the process that spurs the meta-analysis.
When dependencies arise between study series size or
meta-analysis timing and results within the series, bias
is introduced in the estimates. This bias is inherent to
accumulating data, which is why we gave it the name
Accumulation Bias. Various forms of Accumulation Bias
have been characterized before, in very general terms as
“bias introduced by the order in which studies are con-
ducted” (Whitehead, 2002, p. 197) and more specifi-
cally, such as bias caused by the dependence of follow-
up studies on previous studies’ significance and the de-
pendence of meta-analysis timing on previous study re-
sults (Ellis and Stewart, 2009). Also, more elaborate re-
lations were studied between the existence of follow-up
studies, study design and meta-analysis estimates (Kulin-
skaya et al., 2016). Yet no approach to confront these
biases has been proposed.
In this paper we define Accumulation Bias to encompass
processes that not only affect parameter estimates but also
the shape of the sampling distribution, which is why only
approximation and correction for bias does not achieve
valid p-value tests. We illustrate this by an example in Sec-
tion 3, right after we give a general introduction to Accu-
mulation Bias in Section 2 with its relation to publication
bias (Section 2.1) and an informal characterization of the
direction of the bias (Section 2.2). By presenting its diver-
sity, we argue throughout the paper that any efficient sci-
entific process will introduce some form of Accumulation
Bias and that the exact process can never be fully known.
We collect the various forms of Accumulation Bias into
one framework (Section 4) and show that all are related
to the time aspect in meta-analysis. The framework incor-
porates dependencies mentioned by Whitehead (2002),
Ellis and Stewart (2009) and Kulinskaya et al. (2016) as
well the effect of multiple testing over time in living sys-
tematic reviews (Simmonds et al., 2017). We conclude
that some version of these biases will also be introduced
by Evidence-Based Research.
Our framework specifies analysis time probabilities — with
behavior familiar from survival analysis — and distin-
guishes two approaches to error control: conditional on
time (Section 5.1) and surviving over time (Section 5.2).
We show that general meta-analyses take the former ap-
proach, while existing methods for living systematic re-
views take the latter. However, neither of the two is able
to analyze study series affected by partially unknown pro-
cesses of Accumulation Bias (Section 5.3). After an in-
termezzo on evidence that indeed such processes are al-
ready at play in Section 6, we introduce a general form
of a test statistic that is able to withstand any Accumula-
tion Bias process: the likelihood ratio. We specify bounds
on error probabilities that are valid despite the existing
bias, for error control conditional on time (Section 7.1)
as well as surviving over time (Section 7.2). The reader
is left to choose between the two; the consequences of
either preference are specified in Section 8. We try to
give intuition on why both are still possible in their re-
spective sections 7.1 and 7.2, but also give some extra
intuition on the magic of likelihood ratios in Section 9:
Likelihood ratios have an interpretation as betting profit
that can be reinvested in future studies. At the same time,
the meta-analyst is allowed to cash out at any time and
advise against future studies. Hence, the likelihood ratio
relates the statistics of Accumulation Bias to the accumu-
lating nature of scientific knowledge, which is critical in
reducing research waste.
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2 Accumulation Bias
Any meta-analyst carries out a meta-analysis under the
assumption that synthesizing previous studies will add to
what is already known from existing studies. So meta-
analyses are mainly performed on series of studies of
meaningful size. What is considered meaningful varies
considerably: 16 and 15 studies per meta-analysis were
reported to be the median numbers in Medline meta-
analyses from 2004 and 2014 (Moher et al., 2007a; Page
et al., 2016), while 3 studies per meta-analysis were re-
ported in Cochrane meta-analyses from 2008 (Cochrane
Database of Systematic Reviews (Davey et al., 2011)).
Since meta-analyses are performed on research hypothe-
ses that have spurred a certain study series size, they al-
ways report estimates that are conditioned on the avail-
ability of such a series. The crucial point is that not all
pilot studies or small study series will reach a meaning-
ful size, and that doing so might depend on results in the
series. Apart from the dependent size of the study series,
the exact timing of a meta-analysis can also depend on
the available results. The completion of a highly powered
or otherwise conclusive study, for example, might be con-
sidered to finalize the series and trigger a meta-analysis.
So meta-analysis also report estimates conditioned on the
consideration that a systematic synthesis will be informa-
tive. Both dependencies — series size and meta-analysis
timing — introduce bias: Accumulation Bias.
2.1 Accumulation Bias vs. publication bias
Publication bias refers to the practice that studies with
nonsignificant, or more general, unsatisfactory results
have smaller probability to be published than studies with
significant, satisfactory results. So unsatisfactory stud-
ies are performed, but do not reach the meta-analyst be-
cause they are stashed away in a file drawer (Rosenthal,
1979). Accumulation Bias, on the other hand, refers to
some studies or meta-analyses not being performed at all,
as a result of previous findings in a series of studies. In
a file drawer-free world, Accumulation Bias would still
exist. But Accumulation Bias is a manageable problem
because it does not operate at the individual study level.
Conditional on the fact that a second study is performed,
the second study is an unbiased sample. Conditional on
the fact that a third study is performed, for whatever rea-
son, the third study is an unbiased sample. So bias is in-
troduced at the level of the series, not at the study level.
This is different for publication bias, where, conditional
on being published, the studies available are not an un-
biased sample. We exploit the difference in this paper by
considering time in error control.
Of course, Accumulation Bias and publication bias are not
alone in their effects on meta-analysis reporting. All sorts
of significance chasing biases — selective-outcome bias,
selective analysis reporting bias and fabrication bias —
might be present in the study series up for meta-analysis,
and can lead to “wrong and misleading answers” (Ioanni-
dis, 2010, p. 169). But for a world in which these biases
are overcome, we also need tests that reflect how scien-
tific knowledge accumulates.
2.2 Accumulation Bias’ direction
Accumulation Bias in estimates is mainly bias in the sat-
isfactory direction, which means that the effect under
study is overestimated. This is the case for bias caused
by size of the studies series when (overly) optimistic ini-
tial estimates (either in individual studies or in intermedi-
ate meta-analyses) give rise to more studies, while disap-
pointing results terminate a series of studies. This is also
the case when the timing of the meta-analysis is based on
an (overly) optimistic last study estimate or an (overly)
optimistic meta-analysis synthesis is considered the final
one. We focus on this satisfactory direction of Accumula-
tion Bias and will only briefly discuss other possibilities in
Section 5.3 and 6.1. We introduce the wide variety of pos-
sible dependencies in an Accumulation Bias Framework in
Section 4, which has a generality that also includes Ac-
cumulation Bias without a clear direction. But we first
present Accumulation Bias’ effects on error control by an
example.
3 A Gold Rush example: new studies
after finding significant results
We study the effect of Accumulation Bias by a simple
example. Its simplicity allows us to calculate the exact
amount of bias in the test statistic and investigate the ad-
ditional effect on the sampling distribution. The example
given in this section is an extension of the toy example
introduced by Ellis and Stewart (2009). We denote this
example by Gold Rush because it describes how new stud-
ies go looking for more results after finding initial statis-
tical significance. In the current culture of scientific prac-
tice, statistical significance can be seen as the currency
of scientific success. After all, significant results achieve
the future possibility to pay off in publications, grants and
tenure positions. When a gold rush for statistical signif-
icance presents itself in a series of studies, dependencies
arise between the size of the series and the results within:
Accumulation Bias. We specify this mechanism in detail in
Section 3.2 and 3.3, after we simplified our meta-analysis
setting to common/fixed-effects meta-analysis in Section
3.1. We present the resulting bias in the test estimates
in Section 3.4 and its additional effects on the sampling
distribution and testing in Section 3.5 and 3.6. In Section
3.7 we conclude by pointing out the very mild condition
needed for some form of Gold Rush Accumulation Bias to
occur
3.1 Common/fixed-effect meta-analysis
This paper discusses meta-analysis in its simplest form,
which is common-effect meta-analysis, also known as
fixed-effect meta-analysis. This restriction does not
mean that more complex forms of meta-analysis, such as
random-effects meta-analysis and meta-regression, do not
suffer from the problems mentioned in this paper. The
reason for simplification is to reduce the complexity in
quantifying the problem, part of showing that quantifica-
tion is not enough. In a future paper we will study the ef-
fects of heterogeneity on testing in more detail. For an ex-
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ample of Accumulation Bias in random-effects estimates
we refer to Kulinskaya et al. (2016).
Common-effect meta-analysis derives a combined Z-score
from the summary statistics of the available studies. This
combined Z-score is used as a test statistic in two-sided
meta-analysis testing by comparing it to the tails of a stan-
dard normal distribution. This is equivalent to assessing
whether its absolute value is more than z α
2
standard devi-
ations away from zero (larger than 1.960 for α = 0.05).
We simplify the setting by assuming studies with equal
standard deviations to obtain an easy to handle expres-
sion for the combined Z-score of t available studies. We
denote this meta-analysis Z-score by Z (t) and derive it as
the weighted average over the study Z-scores Z1, . . . , Zt ,
shown in its general form in Eq. (3.1a) and in Eq. (3.1b)
under the assumption of equal study sizes:
Z (t) =
∑t
i=1
p
ni Zip
N (t)
with N (t) =
t∑
i=1
ni (3.1a)
=
1p
t
t∑
i=1
Zi (n1 = n2 = · · ·= nt = n). (3.1b)
See Appendix A.1 for a derivation from the mean differ-
ence notation in Borenstein et al. (2009).
3.2 Gold Rush new study probabilities
In our Gold Rush example, we assume the following de-
pendency within a series of studies: each study in a series
has a larger probability to be replicated — and therefore
expanding the series of studies — if the study shows a sig-
nificant positive effect. So the existence of a new study is
dependent on the significance and sign of the results of its
predecessor.
T is the random variable that denotes the maximum size
of a study series — the time at which the search stops.
We enumerate time by the order of appearance in a study
series, with t = 1 for the pilot study, t = 2 for the second
study (so now we have a two-study series) etc. So we
use t to denote the number of studies available for meta-
analysis at any time point: our notion of time is not re-
lated to actual dates at which studies are performed. The
maximum time T is usually unknown since more studies
might be performed in the future. T ≥ 2 means that the
series has not halted after the first initial study, but that it
is unknown how many replications will eventually be per-
formed. In our extended Gold Rush example, we present
the Accumulation Bias process by the probability that the
maximum size is at least one study larger than the current
size (T ≥ t + 1), and do so using six parameters. We de-
note these parameters by the new study probabilities, since
they indicate the probability that a follow-up study is per-
formed when the result of the current study is available:
ω(1)
S
:=P

T ≥ 2
 T ≥ 1, Z1 ≥ z α2  = 1
ω(1)
X
:=P

T ≥ 2
 T ≥ 1, Z1 ≤ −z α2  = 0
ω(1)
NS
:=P

T ≥ 2
 T ≥ 1, |Z1|< z α2  = 0.1,
for all t ≥ 2 : (3.2)
ω(t)
S
= ωS := P

T ≥ t + 1
 T ≥ t, Zt ≥ z α2  = 1
ω(t)
X
= ωX := P

T ≥ t + 1
 T ≥ t, Zt ≤ −z α2  = 0
ω(t)
NS
=ωNS := P

T ≥ t + 1
 T ≥ t, |Zt |< z α2  = 0.02.
We distinguish between the influence of the first pilot
study (ω(1)S , ω
(1)
X and ω
(1)
NS ) and the others (ωS, ωX and
ωNS) since pilot studies are carried out with future stud-
ies in mind, and therefore replications have higher prob-
ability after the first than after other studies in the series,
also in case the pilot study is not significant. We assume
that no new study is performed when a significant nega-
tive result is obtained (ω(1)X = ωX = 0) and new studies
are always performed after positive significant findings,
the satisfactory result (ω(1)S = ωS = 1). Nonsignificant
results have a small, but not negligible probability to spur
new studies (ω(1)NS = 0.1, ωNS = 0.02).
3.3 Gold Rush new study probabilities’ inde-
pendence from data-generating hypothe-
sis
In the following we use P1 to express probabilities under
the alternative hypothesis and P0 to express probabilities
under the null hypothesis. Our new study probabilities
in (3.2) were given without reference to any of these hy-
potheses, to make explicit that they depend solely on the
data (or summary statistic Zt) and not on the hypothesis
that generated the data. So P in these definitions can be
read as P1 as well as P0.
In the next sections we focus on Gold Rush Accumulation
Bias under the null hypothesis and its effect on type-I er-
ror control. The values in rightmost column of Eq. (3.2)
are introduced to obtain estimates for the Accumulation
Bias in the test estimates. These values are not supposed
to be realistic, but are chosen to demonstrate the effect
of Accumulation Bias as clearly as possible. The extreme
values 1 for ω(1)S and ωS given in Eq. (3.2) support the
simulation of large study series under the null hypothe-
sis. The small values for ω(1)NS and ωNS are chosen such
that the effect of significant findings on the sampling dis-
tribution is clearly visible (see Section 3.5 and Figure 1).
For α = 0.05, ω(1)S = 1 implies that, in expectation un-
der the null distribution, all of the 2.5% (α2 ) positively
significant pilot studies under the null hypothesis become
a two-study series, while ω(1)NS = 0.1 indicates that, since
an expected 95% (1−α) of pilot studies is not significant
under the null hypothesis, 9.5% (0.1·95%) become a two-
study series. For study series beyond the pilot study and
its replication, this setup entails that in all studies, ex-
cept for the last and the first, the fraction of significant
findings is more than half, since ωS = 0.02 implies that
only 0.02 · 95% = 1.9% nonsignificant studies grow into
a larger study series: the expected fraction of significant
studies in growing series under the null hypothesis con-
verges to 2.5/(2.5+ 1.9) = 0.6.
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Table 1. Expected Z-scores under the null hypothesis in the Gold Rush scenario, under the equal study size
assumption, calculated using Eq. (3.4b) with α = 0.05 and values for ω(1)S , ω
(1)
NS , ωS and ωNS from Eq. (3.2). Z
(t)
is as defined in Eq. (3.1b). See Appendix A.7 for the code that was used to calculate these values.
Number of
studies (t) E0 [Zt] E0 [Zt | T ≥ t + 1] E0

Z (t)
 T ≥ t
1 0.000 0.487 0.000
2 0.000 1.328 0.344
3 0.000 1.328 1.048
4 0.000 1.328 1.572
5 0.000 1.328 2.000
6 0.000 1.328 2.368
7 0.000 1.328 2.695
8 0.000 1.328 2.990
9 0.000 1.328 3.262
10 0.000 1.328 3.515
3.4 Gold Rush Accumulation Bias’ estimates
under the null hypothesis
The new study probability parameters in Eq. (3.2) are
much larger when results are positively significant than
when they are not. As a result, study series that contain
more significant studies have larger probabilities to come
into existence than those that contain less. While the ex-
pectation of a Z-score is 0 under the null hypothesis for
each individual study (for all t: E0 [Zt] = 0), the expec-
tation of a study that is part of a series of studies is larger.
This shift in expectation introduces the Accumulation Bias
in the estimates.
The main ingredient of the bias in the meta-analysis Z (t)-
score is the bias in the individual study Zt -scores, con-
ditional on being part of a series. This is already ap-
parent for the pilot study, which we use as an example
by expressing its expected value under the null hypoth-
esis, given that it has a successor study: E0 [Z1 | T ≥ 2].
This conditional expectation is a weighted average of two
other expectations that are conditioned further based on
the events that lead to a new study according to Eq.
(3.2): E0

Z1
 Z1 ≥ z α2 , Z1 from the right tail of the null
distribution, and the nonsignificant results with expecta-
tion E0

Z1
 |Z1|< z α2 . We discard negative significant
results, since those were given 0 probability to produce
replication studies in Eq. (3.2). The positive significant
and nonsignificant results are weighted by the new study
probabilities in Eq. (3.2) and the probabilities under the
null distribution of sampling from either the tail (α) or
the middle part (1− α) of the standard normal distribu-
tion. A more detailed specification of these components
can be found in Appendix A.2. If we assume a significance
threshold of 5% we obtain:
For α= 0.05 :
E0 [Z1 | T ≥ 2]
=
∫∞
z α
2
z ·φ(z)dz ·ω(1)S · α2 + 0 ·ω(1)NS · (1−α)
ω
(1)
S · α2 +ω(1)NS · (1−α)
≈ 0.487.
(3.3)
Here we use the fact that, for α = 0.05,
E0

Z1
 Z1 ≥ z α2  = ∫∞1.960 z · φ(z)dz ≈ 2.338, with
φ() the standard normal density function and that
E0

Z1
 |Z1|< z α2  is the expectation of a symmetrically
truncated standard normal distribution, which is 0.
The value 0.487 is obtained by using the parameter
values given in Eq. (3.2). For studies in the series later
than the pilot study, the expression follows analogously
by taking for all t ≥ 2 : ω(t)S = ωS and ω(t)NS = ωNS:
E0 [Zt | T ≥ t + 1]≈ 1.328.
To determine the effect on the meta-analysis Z (t)-score,
we define the expectation under the null hypothesis
E0

Z (t)
 T ≥ t, conditioned on the availability of a series
of size t. To specify this expectation, we use that the last
study is always unbiased since we do not know whether
it will spur more studies. As shown in more detail in Ap-
pendix A.3, the expression follows from Eq. (3.1a) by sep-
arately treating the unbiased expectation of 0 and the pi-
lot study. If we assume a significance threshold of 5%,
we obtain the general expression in Eq. (3.4a) and the
expression in Eq. (3.4b) under the assumption of equal
study sizes (n1 = n2 = · · ·= nt = n):
For α= 0.05, for all t ≥ 2 :
E0

Z (t)
 T ≥ t
≈
p
n1 · 0.487+∑t−1i=2pni · 1.328+pnt · 0p
N (t)
(3.4a)
=
0.487+ 1.328(t − 2)p
t
. (3.4b)
Table 1 shows the Accumulation Bias in the estimates
of E0

Z (t)
 T ≥ t as studies accumulate under the Gold
Rush scenario, with equal study sizes and values for the
new study probabilities given by Eq. (3.2).
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Figure 1. Sampling distributions of meta-analysis Z (t)-scores under the null hypothesis in the Gold Rush scenario,
under the equal study size assumption, with α = 0.05 and values for ω(1)S , ω
(1)
NS , ωS and ωNS from Eq. (3.2). Z
(t)
is as defined in Eq. (3.1b). φ(z|E0(3)) the standard normal density function shifted by E0(3), with E0(3) shorthand
for E0

Z (3)
 T ≥ 3. See Appendix A.7 for the code that produces the simulation and creation of this figure.
3.5 Gold Rush Accumulation Bias’ sampling
distribution under the null hypothesis
Figure 1 shows simulated Gold Rush sampling distribu-
tions for study series of size two and three in comparison
to an individual study Z-distribution. Because the new
study probabilities in Eq. (3.2) give Zt−1-values below−z α
2
zero probability to warrant a successor study, values
for the z(t)-statistic below −z α
2
will be scarce and the larger
t is the larger this scarcity will be since only the last study
is able to provide such small Z-score estimates. The oppo-
site is the case for values above z α
2
, which have probability
1 to warrant a new study. As a result, the distribution of
the meta-analysis Z-score has negative skew (more mass
on the right, more tail to the left). See the comparison
to the normal distribution also plotted in Figure 1 for a
three-study series. Skewness is not the only characteristic
that distinguishes the resulting distribution from a stan-
dard normal. The variance also deviates since the meta-
analysis distribution is a mixture distribution.
For a two-study meta-analysis Z (2) we obtain a mixture of
two conditional distributions, one conditioned on the first
study being a significant — sampled from the right tail
of the distribution (with probability α2 ·ω(1)S ) — and one
with the first study nonsignificant — sampled from the
symmetrically truncated normal distribution (with prob-
ability (1−α) ·ω(1)NS ). Because the combined distribution
on Z (2) is a mixture of the two scenarios, its variance
is larger than the variance of either of the two compo-
nents of the mixture, as we show in Appendix A.4. In
Figure 1 we see that, with the parameter values from
Eq. (3.2) the variance of Z (2) and Z (3) are even larger
than that of Z1, even though both Var
¦
Z (2)
 Z1 < z α2 © and
Var
¦
Z (2)
 |Z1| ≥ z α2 © are smaller. Hence the sampling dis-
tribution under the null hypothesis of a meta-analysis Z-
score deviates from a standard normal under Accumula-
tion Bias due to a non-zero location (the bias), skewness
and inflated variance. All three inflate the probability of
a type-I error in a standard normal test, as we will study
in the next section.
3.6 Gold Rush Accumulation Bias’ influence on
p-value tests
Let us now establish the effect of our Gold Rush
Accumulation Bias on meta-analysis testing when us-
ing common/fixed-effects Z-tests. Let E (t)TYPE-I indicate
the event of a type-I error (significant result under
the null hypothesis) in a meta-analysis of t studies
and let P0
E (t)TYPE-I  T ≥ t = P0 |Z (t)| ≥ z α2  T ≥ t de-
note the expected rate of type-I errors in a two-sided
common/fixed-effect Z-test for studies i up to t condi-
tional on the fact that at least t studies were performed.
We obtain the type-I error rate for this test by simulating
the Gold Rush scenario, for which the results are shown
in the right hand column of Table 2, assuming α = 0.05.
If only bias would be at play, the sampling distribution
under the null hypothesis would be a shifted normal dis-
tribution. Eq. (3.5) expresses the expected type-I error
rate for this bias only scenario, with Φ() the cumulative
normal distribution. The inflation actual inflation in the
type-I error rate is larger than shown by this scenario, as
illustrated the Table 2. The difference between these two
type-I error rates for a series of three studies is depicted in
Figure 1 by the area under the red histogram for Z (3) and
the red φ(z | E0(3)) curve below −z α2 and above z α2 . We
conclude that the effect of Accumulation Bias on testing
cannot be corrected by only an approximation of the bias.
fP0 E (t)TYPE-I  T ≥ t := 1−Φz α2 − E0 Z (t)  T ≥ t
+Φ
−z α
2
− E0

Z (t)
 T ≥ t . (3.5)
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Table 2. Inflated type-I error rates for tests affected by bias only and tests affected by bias as well as impaired
sampling distribution. Simulated values are under the null hypothesis in the Gold Rush scenario, under the equal
study size assumption, with α= 0.05 and values for ω(1)S , ω
(1)
NS , ωS and ωNS from Eq. (3.2). See Appendix A.7 for
the code that produces the simulation and creation of this table.
Number of studies (t) fP0[E (t)TYPE-I | T ≥ t] P0[E (t)TYPE-I | T ≥ t]
2 0.06 0.10
3 0.18 0.23
4 0.35 0.40
5 0.52 0.53
3.7 Gold Rush Accumulation Bias: When does
it occur?
We indicated in Section 3.3 that we chose extreme val-
ues for parameters ω(1)S , ω
(1)
X , ω
(1)
NS , ωS, ωX and ωNS such
that Figure 1 would clearly show the bias and distribu-
tional change that occurs. However, for any combination
of values for which there is a t where ω(t)S 6= ω(t)X 6= ω(t)NS
Accumulation Bias occurs for series larger than size t and
p-value tests that assume a standard normal distribution
are invalid.
4 The Accumulation Bias Framework
In general, Accumulation Bias in meta-analysis makes the
sampling distribution of the meta-analysis Z-score diffi-
cult to characterize due to the data dependent size and
timing of a study series up for meta-analysis. In this sec-
tion, we specify both processes in a framework of analysis
time probabilities. We use the term analysis time because
time in meta-analysis is partly based on a survival time.
A survival time indicates that a subject lives longer than
time t (and might still become much older), just as an
analysis time indicates that a series up for meta-analysis
has at least size t (but might still grow much larger). As
such, analysis time probabilities, just as the probabilities
in a survival function, do not add up to 1.
Our Accumulation Bias Framework uses the following no-
tation for its three key components: S(t − 1), A (t) and
A(t). Firstly, S(t − 1) can be understood as the survival
function in the variable time t that indicates the size of
the expanding study series. S(t − 1) denotes the prob-
ability that the available number of studies is at least t
(P[T ≥ t]), so the study series has survived past the previ-
ous study at t−1. Secondly,A (t) indicates the event that
a meta-analysis is performed on a study series of size ex-
actly t. Lastly, A(t) combines the probability that a study
series of certain size is available (S(t − 1)) with the deci-
sionA (t) to perform the analysis on exactly t studies. So
the analysis time probability A(t) represents the general
probability that a meta-analysis of size t — so at time t —
is performed and is the key to describing the influence of
various forms of Accumulation Bias on testing.
4.1 Analysis time probabilities
Let P
A (t)  T ≥ t, z1, . . . , zt denote the probability that
a meta-analysis is performed on the first t studies. Just as
the Gold Rush’ new study probabilities from Eq. (3.2), this
probability can depend on the results in the study series
z1, . . . , zt . The event A (t) only occurs if a series of size t
is available, so we need to condition on the survival past
t − 1, which can also depend on previous results. When
combined, we obtain the following definition1 of analysis
time probabilities A(t):
A(t | z1, . . . , zt) := P
A (t)  T ≥ t, z1, . . . , zt
· S (t − 1 | z1, . . . , zt−1) ,
where we define
S (t − 1 | z1, . . . , zt−1) := P [T ≥ t | z1, . . . , zt−1] .
(4.1)
Eq. (4.1) formalizes the idea of analysis time probabilities
“depending on previous results” in terms of the individual
study Z-scores z1, . . . , zt . This is compatible with the Z-
test approach in meta-analysis and the dependencies and
the Gold Rush’ new study probabilities that are explicitly
expressed in terms of Z-scores. More generally however,
in Section 4.3 and 4.4 we extend the definition and allow
analysis time probabilities to also depend on the data in
the original scale and external parameters.
4.2 Analysis time probabilities’ independence
from the data-generating hypothesis
Just as for the Gold Rush’ new study probabilities dis-
cussed in Section 3.2 and 3.3, the analysis time probabil-
ities A(t) only depend on the data, and are independent
from the hypothesis that generated the data. So again, P
in these definitions can be read as P1 as well as P0. Our
definition of A(t) relates to the definition of a Stopping
Rule by Berger and Berry (1988, pp. 33-34), where they
use x (m) to denote a vector of m observations:
1Note that A(t | z1, . . . , zt ) is defined as a product of two (conditional)
probabilities. Calling this product itself a “probability”, as we do, can be
justified as follows: we currently think of the decision whether to con-
tinue studies at time t, i.e. whether T ≥ t, to be made before the t-th
study is performed. But we may also think of the t-study result zt as
being generated irrespective of whether T ≥ t, but remaining unob-
served for ever if T < t. If the decision whether T ≥ t is made indepen-
dently of the value zt , i.e. we add the constraint P [T ≥ t | z1, . . . , zt−1] =
P [T ≥ t | z1, . . . , zt ], then the resulting model is mathematically equiv-
alent to ours (in the sense that we obtain exactly the same expressions
for S(t), A(t | z1, . . . , zt ), all error probabilities etc.), but it does allow us
to write, by Eq. (4.1), that A(t | z1, . . . , zt ) = P
A (t), T ≥ t  z1, . . . , zt
— so now A(t | z1, . . . , zt ) is indeed a probability.
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Definition. A stopping rule is a sequence τ =
(τ0,τ1, . . . ) in which τ0 ∈ [0,1] is a constant
and τm is a measurable function of x
(m) for m≥
1, taking values in [0, 1].
τ0 is the probability of stopping the experiment
with no observations (e.g., if it is determined
that the experiment is too expensive); τ1(x (1))
is the probability of stopping after observing the
datum x (1) = x1, conditional on having taken
the first observation; τ2(x (2)) is the probability
of stopping after observing x (2) = (x1, x2), con-
ditional on having taken the first and second ob-
servations; etc.
To take the analogy with survival analysis further, we
consider the sequence τ defined above by Berger and
Berry (1988) to be a sequence of hazards. Instead of
using their notation τ we denote the Stopping Rule by
λ = (λ(0),λ(1), . . . ) to emphasize its behavior as a se-
quence of hazard functions and to distinguish time t from
the probability λ(t) of stopping at that time given that you
were able to reach it. The hazard of stopping at time t can
depend on previous results and is defined as follows:
λ (t | z1, . . . , zt) := P [T = t | T ≥ t, z1, . . . , zt] . (4.2)
In this paper we are only interested in cases in which a first
study is available, so λ(0) = 0 (also stated as P[T ≥ 1] =
1 in Appendix A.2). The survival S(t −1), the probability
of obtaining a series of size at least t (so larger than t −
1), follows from the hazards by considering that surviving
past time t − 1 means that the series has not stopped at
studies i up to and including t − 1. So for t ≥ 1:
S (t − 1 | z1, . . . , zt−1) =
t−1∏
i=0
(1−λ (i | z1, . . . , zi)). (4.3)
In many examples, the hazard of stopping at time t, λ(t),
will depend on the result zt just obtained. In that case
λ (i | z1, . . . , zi) = λ (i | zi) in Eq. (4.3) above. But in gen-
eral λ(t) might also depend on some synthesis of all zi so
far. We show some of the variety of forms that λ(t), S(t)
and A(t) can take in our Accumulation Bias Framework in
the following sections.
4.3 Accumulation Bias caused by dependent
study series size
Our Gold Rush example describes an instance of Accu-
mulation Bias that is caused by how the study series size
comes about. This is expressed by the S(t) component of
the analysis times probability A(t). We represent our Gold
Rush scenario in terms of our Accumulation Bias frame-
work in next section, followed by variations from the lit-
erature that we were able to express in a similar manner.
4.3.1 Gold Rush: dependence on significant
study results
The Gold Rush scenario operates in a general meta-
analysis setting and assumes that there is a single ran-
dom or prespecified time t at which a study series is up
for meta-analysis. This is the approach taken by meta-
analyses not explicitly part of a living systematic review.
In the Gold Rush example the dependency arises in the
study series because a t-study series has a larger proba-
bility to come into existence when individual study results
are significant, and you need a t-study series to perform
a t-study meta-analysis. This dependency was character-
ized by the new study probabilitiesω(1)S ,ω
(1)
NS ,ωS andωNS
from Eq. (3.2). The value of S(t), and therefore A(t),
can be expressed in terms of these new study probabil-
ities by considering whether z1, . . . , zt−1 are larger than
z α
2
(which is 1.960 for α = 0.05). Since a meta-analysis
is performed only once at a randomly chosen time t, we
have P[A (t)] = 1 for that time t and P[A (t)] = 0 other-
wise. So for the one meta-analysis we obtain:
For t such that P[A (t)] = 1 :
A(t | z1, . . . , zt−1;α) =S (t − 1 | z1, . . . , zt−1;α)
=
t−1∏
i=0
(1−λ (i | zi;α)) ,
(4.4)
with λ (0) = 0 and for all i ≥ 1, λ(i) is defined as follows:
λ (i | zi ,α) = 1−

ω(i)
S
·1zi≥z α2 +ω(i)NS ·1|zi |<z α2

λ0 (i |α) := E0 [λ(i | Zi;α)]
= 1−

ω(i)
S
· α
2
+ω(i)
NS
· (1−α)

.
(4.5)
Therefore, (leaving out the λ(0) and summing from i =
1 to t − 1), we obtain the following expressions for the
Gold Rush analysis time probabilities and its expectations
under the null distribution:
A(t | z1, . . . , zt−1;α) =
t−1∏
i=1

ω(i)
S
·1zi≥z α2 +ω(i)NS ·1|zi |<z α2

A0 (t |α) :=E0 [A(t | Z1, . . . , Zt−1;α)]
=
t−1∏
i=1

ω(i)
S
· α
2
+ω(i)
NS
· (1−α)

.
(4.6)
4.3.2 Kulinskaya et al. (2016): dependence on
meta-analysis estimates
Kulinskaya et al. (2016) report biases that result from de-
pendencies between a current meta-analysis estimate and
the decision to perform a new study. Since their focus is
on bias, they do not discuss issues of multiple testing over
time, which would arise if their cumulative meta-analyses
estimates were tested. In this section we assume that the
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timing of the meta-analysis test is independent from the
estimates that determined the size of the series, as if a
test were done by a second unknowing meta-analyst. This
scenario is hinted at by Kulinskaya et al. (2016, p. 296)
in the statement “When a practitioner or a meta-analyst
finds several trials in the literature, a particular decision-
making scenario may have already taken place.” We post-
pone the discussion of multiple testing to Section 4.3.4. In
this estimation setting, the decision to perform new stud-
ies is determined not by the meta-analysis Z-scores Z (t−1),
but by the meta-analysis estimates on the original scale
M (t−1) (notation adopted from Borenstein et al. (2009),
see Appendix A.1), in relation to a minimally clinically
relevant effect ∆H1. A minimally clinically relevant effect
is the effect that should be used to power a trial (in the
alternative distribution H1), and therefore, the effect that
the researchers of the study do not want to miss. Kulin-
skaya et al. (2016) consider three models for the study
series accumulation process: the power-law model and the
extreme-value model and the probit model. The models re-
late the probability of a new study to the cumulative meta-
analysis estimate of the study series so far and are inspired
by models for publication bias. Although all three models
can be recast in our framework, we demonstrate this only
for the power law model that uses one extra parameter
τ to relate the previous meta-analysis estimate M(t−1) to
S(t). Just as in the Gold Rush scenario, we must assume
that a meta-analysis test is performed only once at a ran-
domly chosen time t. So only at that time t P[A (t)] = 1
and P[A (t)] = 0 otherwise. We obtain the following ex-
pression for the Kulinskaya et al. (2016) power-law model:
For t such that P[A (t)] =1 :
A
 
t
M (t−1);∆H1,τ= S  t − 1 M (t−1);∆H1,τ
=
t−1∏
i=0
(1−λ  i M (t−1);∆H1,τ),
(4.7)
with λ(0) = λ(1) = 0, and for all i ≥ 2, λ(i) is defined as
follows:
λ
 
i
M (i−1);∆H1,τ= 1−M (i−1)
∆H1
τ
, (4.8)
for 0< M (i−1) <∆H1 and 1 (so 1−λ= 0) otherwise.
According to this model, no further studies are performed
as soon as an estimate as large as ∆H1 is found. For esti-
mates smaller than∆H1, the closer the estimate is to∆H1,
the larger the probability of a subsequent study. Just as
in the Gold Rush example, this model will introduce bias
as well as skew the sampling distribution of the data un-
der the null hypothesis since initial studies with large es-
timates have larger probability to end up in study series
of considerable size than small initial estimates do. When
the initial study gives a large overestimation of the effect,
this overestimation stays present in the subsequent meta-
analysis estimates and keeps influencing the probability
of subsequent studies. Therefore, this model shows the
effect of early studies in the series even more clearly than
the Gold Rush example. However, the accumulation bias
does have a cap, since estimates larger than ∆H1 do not
introduce new replication studies.
4.3.3 Whitehead (2002): dependence on early
study results
Bias may also be introduced by the order in
which studies are conducted. For example,
large-scale clinical trials for a new treatment
are often undertaken following promising re-
sults from small trials. [...] given that a meta-
analysis is being undertaken, larger estimates of
treatment difference are more likely from the
small early studies than from the later larger
studies. –Whitehead (2002, p. 197)
Whitehead (2002) mentions a dependence between the
results of the small early studies in a series and the size
of the series. This influence could either be based on the
significance of early findings, such as in the Gold Rush ex-
ample (Section 4.3.1), or on the estimates in the initial
studies, such as in the power law model from (Kulinskaya
et al., 2016) (Section 4.3.2). (Whitehead, 2002) does not
give sufficient details to specify this dependency explicitly,
but we are confident that it will fit in our Accumulation
Bias framework.
Two ways to approach this Accumulation Bias are given
in (Whitehead, 2002). The first is to exclude early studies
from the meta-analyses, either in the main analysis or in
a sensitivity analysis. The second way is to ignore the
problem, since the small studies will have little effect on
the overall estimate. In Section 7 we show that any small
initial study dependency that can be expressed in terms
of A(t) can be dealt with by tests using likelihood ratios.
4.3.4 Living Systematic Reviews: dependence
on significant meta-analyses + multiple
testing
A living systematic review (LSR) should keep
the review current as new research evidence
emerges. Any meta-analyses included in the
review will also need updating as new mate-
rial is identified. If the aim of the review is
solely to present the best current evidence stan-
dard meta-analysis may be sufficient, provided
reviewers are aware that results may change at
later updates. If the review is used in a decision-
making context, more caution may be needed.
When using standard meta-analysis methods,
the chance of incorrectly concluding that any
updated meta-analysis is statistically significant
when there is no effect (the type I error) in-
creases rapidly as more updates are performed.
–Simmonds, Salanti, McKenzie & Elliott (2017,
p. 39)
In living systematic reviews, the aim is to have a meta-
analysis available to present the current evidence, thus
synthesizing the t studies available at a certain time. The
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current meta-analysis estimate might be used to decide
whether further studies should be performed. In that case
S(t−1), the probability that a study series of size t is avail-
able — so that a study series has expanded beyond series
size t−1 — depends on the meta-analysis estimate Z (t−1)
at the previous study’s meta-analysis. Because the review
is continuously updated, P[A ] is always 1, and living sys-
tematic reviews can be described by the following analysis
time probability A(t):
A

t
 z(1), . . . , z(t); z α
2

= P
A (t)  T ≥ t
· S t − 1  z(1), . . . , z(t); z α
2

= S

t − 1
 z(1), . . . , z(t−1); z α
2

=
t−1∏
i=0
(1−λi  z(i); z α
2

).
(4.9)
The quote above warns against decisions based on the
continuously updated meta-analysis using a fixed thresh-
old z α
2
. Living systematic reviews experience multiple
testing problems of a kind that are familiar from statisti-
cal monitoring of individual clinical trials (Proschan et al.,
2006). If the study series is stopped as soon as a sig-
nificance threshold is reached, and the obtained meta-
analysis is considered the final one, then this final meta-
analysis test has an increased chance of a type-I error. So
the warning is not to use the following simple stopping
rule:
λ

i
 z(i); z α
2

= 1|Z (i)|≥z α
2
. (4.10)
Various corrections to significance thresholds are pro-
posed that relate intermediate looks to a maximum sam-
ple size or information size. These corrected thresholds
depend on α and the fraction of sample size or informa-
tion size available at time t. Examples of such methods
are Trial sequential analysis (Brok et al., 2008; Thorlund
et al., 2008; Wetterslev et al., 2008) and Sequential meta-
analysis (Whitehead, 2002, Ch. 12) (Whitehead, 1997;
Higgins et al., 2011). For an overview see Simmonds et al.
(2017). In general, Eq. (4.9) and (4.10) show that any
dependency between “the best current evidence” and the
accumulation of future studies is part of our Accumula-
tion Bias Framework. We discuss the approach to error
control taken by the corrected thresholds in Section 5.2.
4.4 Accumulation Bias caused by dependent
meta-analysis timing
We described various forms of Accumulation Bias that are
caused by how the study series size comes about, but de-
pendencies are also introduced by how the meta-analysis
itself arises. This is expressed by the P
A (t) component
of the analysis times probabilities A(t). We only found one
such process mentioned in the literature and will discuss
it in the next section.
4.4.1 (Ellis and Stewart, 2009): dependence on
the right amount of positive findings
Meta-analysis times are subtle. A train of neg-
ative findings would generally not stimulate a
meta-analysis. Nor would a string of very posi-
tive findings. [...] All this makes the analysis of
explicitly defined meta-analysis times very dif-
ficult. We conclude that study of bias in meta-
analysis based on parametric modeling of meta-
analysis times is problematical. –Ellis & Stewart
(2009, pp. 2454-2455)
Ellis and Stewart (2009) do not give an explicit model
that we can interpret in terms of A(t), but indicate that it
should depend on the study findings Zi , or in the original
scale, Di (notation adapted from Borenstein et al. (2009),
see Appendix A.1). Given the quote above, the amount of
very positive findings should not be too large, and not too
small. Though exact parametric modeling indeed stays
problematical, we can assume that a positive finding is a
study estimate larger than the minimally clinically rele-
vant effect ∆H1, define the right amount of positive find-
ings to be in the region [a, b], and show that this fits in
our Accumulation Bias Framework by expressing a possi-
ble model for A(t):
For t such that S(t − 1) =1 :
A
 
t
D1, . . . , Dt ; a, b=P A (t)  T ≥ t, D1, . . . , Dt ; a, b
· S  t − 1 D1, . . . , Dt−1; a, b
=P
A (t)  T ≥ t, D1, . . . , Dt ; a, b
=1C∈ [a,b]
with C =
t∑
i=1
1Di>∆H1
.
(4.11)
4.5 Accumulation Bias caused by Evidence-
Based Research
New research should not be done unless, at the
time it is initiated, the questions it proposes to
address cannot be answered satisfactorily with
existing evidence. –Chalmers & Glasziou (2009)
In 2009, the term Research Waste was coined and this
key recommendation was made. The recommendation
further specifies that existing evidence should be ob-
tained by a systematic review and summarized with a
meta-analysis. But how exactly to answer the question
whether new research is necessary or wasteful remained
unclear. Nevertheless, the recommendation was impor-
tant enough to be repeated, as was first done in an entire
series on Research Waste with a specific recommendation
on setting research priorities (Chalmers et al., 2014) and
later in a paper that gave the recommendation its official
name: Evidence-Based Research (Lund et al., 2016). Sup-
port for these recommendations was provided by various
retrospective cummulative meta-analyses that show how
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Table 3. Possible 2001 state of a database of study series per topic, visualizing what study series are taken into
account in the two approaches to error control: conditional on time (blue and grey) and surviving over time
(orange).
Topics
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 . . . 9 998 9 999 10 000
Study series
size (t)
1 z1,1 z1,2 z1,3 z1,4 z1,5 z1,6 z1,7 z1,8 z1,9 z1,10 . . . z1,9998 z1,9999 z1,10000
2 z2,1 z2,2 z2,3 z2,4 z2,5 z2,7 z2,8 z2,10 z2,9998 z2,10000
3 z3,1 z3,2 z3,3 z3,5 z3,7 z3,10 z3,9998 z3,10000
4 z4,2 z4,3 z4,5 z4,7 z4,9998 z4,10000
5 z5,2 z5,5 z5,9998
6 z6,2 z6,5 z6,9998
. . . . . .
136 z136,9998
many studies were still performed while satisfactory ev-
idence was already available. These cummulative meta-
analysis judge “satisfactory evidence” based on a signifi-
cance threshold, usually uncorrected for multiple testing
(e.g. Fergusson et al. (2005)), which reminds us of the
Accumulation Bias that occurs in living systematic reviews
(Section 4.3.4).
The larger consequence, however, is that Accumulation
Bias is caused by any dependencies between results and
series size and meta-analysis timing, and that Evidence-
Based Research introduces such dependencies. Inspecting
previous results to decide whether new research is nec-
essary or wasteful therefore always introduces Accumu-
lation Bias, whether it based on uncorrected or corrected
thresholds. Also more subtle decision methods — implicit
rather than based on thresholds — introduce Accumula-
tion Bias, as was shown by Kulinskaya et al. (2016). In
fact, they describe the rationale behind their models —
among which the power-law model (Section 4.3.2) — as
an example of bias introduced by guidelines to decide on
“the usefulness of a new study” “with direct reference to
existing meta-analysis.” (Kulinskaya et al., 2016, p. 297).
So Evidence-Based Research causes bias, and our Accu-
mulation Bias Framework demonstrates how it might af-
fect the sampling distribution, whether based on explicit
thresholds or implicit decision making. Does this mean
that we cannot make Evidence-Based Research decisions
to avoid research waste, while also controlling type-I er-
rors? Fortunately, we do not need to be that pessimistic
and can still embrace Evidence-Based Research. In Sec-
tion 7 we show that tests based on likelihood ratios with-
stand Accumulation Bias and are very well suited to re-
duce research waste. But to do so, we first need to specify
exactly what role is played by time in error control.
5 Time in error control
Over time new study series are initiated, studies are added
to existing study series and more meta-analyses are per-
formed. To visualize how this process relates to error con-
trol, we need to start with a specific state of this expanding
system. In 2001 an estimated minimum of 10 000 medi-
cal topics were covered in over half a million studies, thus
requiring 10 000 meta-analyses if all were synthesized in
a database such as the Cochrane Database of Systematic Re-
views (Mallett and Clarke, 2003). The number of studies
in a series varied between 2 and 136, which we can use to
describe the 2001 state of a possible database, that to be
complete, also includes many unreplicated pilot studies.
We could visualize this database in a table, with studies in
the rows, topics in the columns and many missing entries.
A sketch is shown in Table 3.
The conventional approach to error control, which we
used to show the influence of Gold Rush Accumulation
Bias in meta-analysis testing in Section 3.6, is a condi-
tional approach. Since conventional meta-analysis does
not raise any multiple testing issues, there is a hidden as-
sumption that the timing of a meta-analysis A (t) is in-
dependent from the data and each study series experi-
ences only one meta-analysis. In Section 4.3.1 we took
the t at which the sole meta-analysis is conducted to be
either random or prespecified. This is shown in Table 3
by the black box enclosing the available studies on Topic
1. Other possible study series up for meta-analysis are
shown by the boxes enclosing studies on Topic 5 and 8.
Note that by assuming only one meta-analysis, a study se-
ries might continue growing but not be fully analyzed, as
shown for Topic 5.
In the conditional approach to error control, a three-study
series (Z1, Z2, Z3) produces a possible draw from the Z (3)
sampling distribution. If we test our draw, the type-I error
rate is defined as the fraction of t-study series that is con-
sidered significant if all t-study series were to be sampled
from the null distribution. The question is: What study
series are taken into account to specify this fraction? This
is visualized in Table 3 by the dark blue and grey shading
for t = 2 and the dark blue and lighter blue shading for
t = 3. The unshaded topics and change of color between
t = 2 and t = 3 show the flaw of this approach: some
series might not survive up until a specific time t, as for
instance shown by the grey studies that are part of t = 2
but not part of the error control for t = 3. We also do not
want every series to survive up until any arbitrary time t
to avoid research waste (Chalmers and Glasziou, 2009).
Page 11 of 24
F1000Research 2016 - DRAFT ARTICLE (PRE-SUBMISSION)
The crucial point is that the series that do survive are no
random sample from all possible t-study series. This is
another illustration of Accumulation Bias such as the Toy
Story scenario. The series deviates even more from the as-
sumption of a random t-study draw if the meta-analysis
time t is not random or prespecified, but dependent on
the results, as expressed in Section 4.4. We discuss the
conventional conditional approach to meta-analysis error
control in more detail in Section 5.1.
The other possible approach to error control is surviving
over analysis times, which means that it should be valid
for any upcoming analysis time t within a series. So the
probability that a type-I error — ever — occurs in the ac-
cumulating series is controlled, whether the series reaches
a large size or not. This is visualized in Table 3 by the or-
ange shading, and has a long run error rate that runs over
series of any size, including the one-study series. This ap-
proach to error control is taken by methods for living sys-
tematic reviews such as Trial sequential analysis and Se-
quential meta-analysis. We discuss this approach of error
control surviving over time in more detail in Section 5.2.
5.1 Error control conditioned on time
The null distributions of the common/fixed meta-analysis
Z-statistic shown in Figure 1 are conditioned on the size
of the series, which is the time: T ≥ t. We can use our
Accumulation Bias framework to give this distribution a
general description, where we use f0(z(t)) to denote the
assumed standard normal null distribution for the meta-
analysis Z-score and obtain a conditional density using
Bayes’ rule:
f0
 
z(t)
A (t), T ≥ t= f0(z(t)) · P0 A (t), T ≥ t  z(t)
P0 [A (t), T ≥ t]
=
f0(z(t)) · A0
 
t
 z(t)
A0 (t)
,
where we define:
A0
 
t
 z(t) := E0 A(t | Z1, . . . , Zt)  Z (t) = z(t)
A0 (t) := E0 [A(t | Z1, . . . , Zt)] ,
with under the equal study size assumption in (Eq. (3.1b))
Z (t) =
1p
t
t∑
i=1
Zi
(5.1)
(extension to the general cases with unequal sample sizes
is straightforward). For the Gold Rush example, A0 (t) was
given by Eq. (4.6) and can be calculated ifωs are known.
A0 (t) denotes the general probability of arriving at T ≥ t
under the null hypothesis, and so does A0
 
t
 z(t), but
with the restriction that we only take samples into ac-
count that result in meta-analysis score z(t). The type-I
error rates for the Gold Rush example shown in Table 2 are
based on a randomly chosen or prespecified t for which
P[A (t)] = 1, and represent the following (with f0 as
above in Eq. (5.1)):
P0
E (t)TYPE-I A (t), T ≥ t= ∫ −z α2−∞ f0  z(t) A (t), T ≥ t dz(t)
+
∫ ∞
z α
2
f0
 
z(t)
A (t), T ≥ t dz(t).
(5.2)
5.2 Error control surviving over time
In living systematic reviews, a meta-analysis is performed
after each new study (P
A (t)= 1 for all t). The proper-
ties on error control obtained by for example Trial Sequen-
tial Analysis are therefore surviving over analysis times
t and depend on the joint distribution on the data and
the maximum study series size T . For P
A (t) always 1,
A(t) = S(t−1) and this joint distribution can be presented
as follows:
f0
 
z(1), . . . , z(t), T = t

= f0
 
z(1), . . . , z(t)
 · P0 T = t  z(1), . . . , z(t) , (5.3)
where we define
P0

T = t
 z(1), . . . , z(t)
:= E0

S(t − 1  Z1, . . . , Zt−1)  Z (1) = z(1), . . .
− E0

S(t
 Z1, . . . , Zt)  Z (1) = z(1), . . . ,
with under the equal study size assumption in (Eq. (3.1b)),
Z (t) =
1p
t
t∑
i=1
Zi ,
and with f0(z
(0)) = 1 and P0

T ≥ 1  z(0), z(1)= 1.
The result P[T = t] = S(t − 1) − S(t) is known from
survival analysis and made explicit in the Appendix A.5.
When S(t) is known for all t, it is possible to obtain
error control that survives over analysis times T = t
with thresholds z(t)α
2
that are functions of α, t and some
Tmax based on a maximum sample or information size.
Such methods are known as Trial sequential analysis (Brok
et al., 2008; Thorlund et al., 2008; Wetterslev et al., 2008)
and Sequential meta-analysis (Whitehead, 2002, Ch. 12)
(Whitehead, 1997; Higgins et al., 2011). If we assume
a one-sided test, the approach to error control taken by
these methods can be expressed as follows:
ET
h
P0
E (T )TYPE-I  Ti
=
Tmax∑
t=1
∫ ∞
z(1)α
2
. . .
∫ ∞
z(t)α
2
f0
 
z(1), . . . , z(t), T = t

dz(1) . . . dz(t)
= α,
with f0 as above (5.3)
and T = t only in the case λ(t) = 1Z (t)≥z(t)α
2
= 1.
(5.4)
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The change in notation from T ≥ t to T = t already hints
at the limitations of this approach: the series size needs
to be completely determined by the thresholds specified
in the hazard function and nothing else. We discuss this
limitation in more detail in the next section.
5.3 Unknown and unreliable analysis time
probabilities
To obtain thresholds to test z(t) under Accumulation Bias,
we need to know the probability A(t) (or only S(t)) for
meta-analysis time t. However, any of the scenarios de-
scribed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 can be involved, and some
can be influencing z(t) simultaneously. Also, ethical im-
peratives might balance the bias, as illustrated by the fol-
lowing quote:
A negative result will dampen enthusiasm and
turn the attention of investigators to other pos-
sible protocols. A positive result will excite in-
terest but may provide an ethical veto on fur-
ther randomization. –Armitage (1984) as cited
by Ellis and Stewart (2009)
We do not believe that the corrected thresholds z(t)α
2
from
sequential methods like Trial Sequential Analysis can ac-
count for all Accumulation Bias, since they require very
strict conformation to the stopping rule based on syn-
thesized studies z(t) and some have already argued that
meta-analysts do not have such control over new stud-
ies (Chalmers and Lau, 1993). Sequential meta-analysis
was proposed for prospective meta-analyses (Whitehead,
1997; Higgins et al., 2011) and never intended for set-
tings with retrospective dependencies. Stopping rules
based solely on meta-analysis ignore dependencies that
might already have arisen at the individual study level
(such as in the Gold Rush example) and that meta-
analyses might in practice not be performed continuously
(so P[A (t)] 6= 1 for some t). When meta-analyses are not
performed continuously, as discussed in Section 4.4, the
specification of which series are included in the long run
error control is missing (imagine for example that some
of the columns 1, 2, 3 and 5 of meta-analyses in Table
3 be excluded in the long run error control because the
individual study results were such that nobody will ever
bother to perform a meta-analysis).
It might be very inefficient to try to avoid Accumulation
Bias. As stated in the introduction, avoiding it would
mean that results from earlier studies should be unknown
when planning new studies as well as when planning
meta-analyses (that is, the decision to do a meta-analysis
after t studies should not depend on the outcome of
these studies). Achieving this might be impossible, since
research is very often somehow inspired by other find-
ings. Also, such approach cannot be reconciled with the
Evidence-Based Research initiative to reduce waste.(Lund
et al., 2016; Chalmers and Glasziou, 2009; Chalmers
et al., 2014).
We conclude that the Accumulation Bias process specify-
ing A(t) can never be fully known and that avoiding an
Accumulation Bias process will introduce more research
waste. So we need a testing method that is valid regard-
less of the exact Accumulation Bias process. We will in-
troduce such a method in Section 7, but first exhibit some
evidence that, even though the recommendations from
Evidence-Based Research still need renewed attention, Ac-
cumulation bias might already be at play.
6 Intermezzo: evidence for the exis-
tence of Accumulation Bias
6.1 Agreement with empirical findings
Accumulation Bias arises due to dependencies in how a
study series comes about (Section 4.3), and in the timing
of the meta-analysis (Section 4.4). We first discuss some
indications of the former and then illustrate how these
can be reinforced by some approaches to the latter.
If citations of previous results are a real indication of why
a replication study is performed, than many such depen-
dencies have been demonstrated in the literature on ref-
erence/citation bias (Gøtzsche, 1987; Egger and Smith,
1998). Citation or reference bias indicates that initial sat-
isfactory results are more often cited than unsatisfactory
results, thus some sort of Gold Rush occurs. Studies into
citations indicate that early small trials are much more
often cited than later large trials (e.g. Fergusson et al.
(2005); Robinson and Goodman (2011)), which might
limit the Gold Rush to the early studies in a series, such
as indicated by Whitehead (2002) (Section 4.3.3). Many
studies have found that early studies are unreliable pre-
dictors of later replications in a study series (Roberts and
Ker, 2015; Chalmers and Glasziou, 2016) (and see refer-
ences 6-34 in Ioannidis (2008) and references 33-49 in
Pereira and Ioannidis (2011)), which is also an indication
of early study Accumulation Bias.
Other empirical findings suggest that Accumulation Bias
might occur throughout a series, but to a lesser extend in
later studies. Gehr et al. (2006), for example, report effect
sizes that decrease over time, but in which study size did
not play a significant role. What has been recognized as
regression to the truth in heart failure studies, might also
be characterized as Accumulation Bias (Krum and Tonkin,
2003). But this effects will be difficult to limit to only
a few early studies, so excluding a certain number from
meta-analysis, as proposed in Whitehead (2002, p. 197)
(Section 4.3.3), might therefore be a too crude measure.
The Proteus effect (Pfeiffer et al., 2011; Ioannidis and
Trikalinos, 2005; Ioannidis, 2005a) describes how early
replications can be biased against initial findings. If early
contradicting findings spur a large series of studies into
a phenomenon, it introduces a more complex pattern of
Accumulation Bias that does not have a straightforward
dominating direction. The same holds for the Value of
Information approach, to decide on replication studies
(Claxton and Sculpher, 2006; Claxton et al., 2002).
There is quite some literature with suggestions on when
a meta-analysis should be updated. One general recom-
mendation is to do so when studies can be added that
will have a large effect on the meta-analysis (Moher and
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Tsertsvadze, 2006; Moher et al., 2007b, 2008). If such
recommendations reflect an overall tendency in timing of
meta-analysis, Accumulation Bias might be re-enforced by
the timing of the meta-analysis: initial misleading studies
might have spurred a study series, and might also indi-
rectly encourage a meta-analysis after later studies report
deviating results.
6.2 Agreement with intuitions about priors
The famous paper “Why Most Published Research Find-
ings are False” (Ioannidis, 2005b) introduced the concept
of field specific prior odds to a large audience. The prior
odds were presented as the “Ratio of True to Not-True Re-
lationships (R)”, which has the same meaning as the frac-
tion of pilot studies from the null and alternative distribu-
tion (pi/(1−pi)) in the terminology of this paper. Ioannidis
(2005b) combines this ratio with the average power and
type-I error of tests in a research field to obtain a field-
specific estimate of the Positive Predictive Value (PPV) of
a significant result. This is the expected rate or target rate
of true to false rejections, and the same as γ ·pi/(1−pi) in
Section 7.1 of this paper.
Ioannidis (2005b) provides prior odds of various research
fields and publication types for which two are of interest
to Accumulation Bias: “Adequately powered RCT with lit-
tle bias” and “Confirmatory meta-analysis of good-quality
RCTs”. For the first of these an R of 1:1 is provided and for
the second an R of 2:1. So a distinction is made between
topics worthy of only one individual study and those that
evoke a series of studies eligible for meta-analysis.
How would the researchers involved in replicating RCTs
know that their topic is worthy of a series of studies in
comparison to just one? The difference between prior
odds of the two indicates that this is no random decision.
The only available source of information would be previ-
ous study results, hence introducing dependence between
study series size and study results: Accumulation Bias. So
the prior odds R specified by Ioannidis (2005b) is actually
pi·A1(t)
(1−pi)·A0(t) , with A1(1) = 1 and A0(1) = 1 for primary stud-
ies.
7 Likelihood ratios’ independence
from meta-analysis time
In Section 5.3 we argued that any approach to model the
analysis time probabilities A(t) is unreliable: in realis-
tic and practically relevant scenarios, the ingredients re-
quired to calculate A(t) will be unknown. Therefore, we
need to define test statistics that are independent from
how a series size or meta-analysis comes about. A pos-
sible form of such a test statistic is the likelihood ratio,
which we discuss from the two approaches to error con-
trol: in the next section 7.1 from the perspective of error
control conditioned on time, and in Section 7.2 from the
perspective of error control surviving over time.
Our proposed use of the likelihood ratio is based on the
following extraordinary property2, already recognized by
2This property is related to the well-known fact that the Bayesian
Berger and Berry (1988) and shown in Eq. (7.1): The
likelihood ratio is a test statistic that depends on the speci-
fication of some alternative distribution f1. Any data sam-
pled from an alternative distribution will have the same
analysis time probabilities as data sampled from the null
distribution, since analysis time probabilities are indepen-
dent from the data-generating hypothesis (Section 4.2).
When a likelihood ratio statistic is obtained for known
data, the analysis time probability is a constant factor that
is the same in the numerator and denominator of the likel-
hood ratio and therefore drops out of the equation:
LR10(t)
 
z1, . . . , zt ,A (t), T ≥ t

:=
f1 (z1, . . . , zt) · P1(A (t), T ≥ t | z1, . . . , zt)
f0 (z1, . . . , zt) · P0(A (t), T ≥ t | z1, . . . , zt)
=
f1 (z1, . . . , zt) · A(t | z1, . . . , zt)
f0 (z1, . . . , zt) · A(t | z1, . . . , zt)
=
f1 (z1, . . . , zt)
f0 (z1, . . . , zt)
= LR10 (z1, . . . , zt) .
(7.1)
Here we used the standard definition of likelihood ra-
tio for the case that the likelihood jointly involves
continuous-valued data and discrete events, and we criti-
cally used the fact that the probability ofA (t), T ≥ t does
not depend on whether the null or the alternative distri-
bution generated the data.
In the following two sections we discuss two means of
using likelihood-ratio based tests that yield results that
are valid irrespective of accumulation bias.3
7.1 Likelihood ratio’s error control condi-
tioned on time
A large study series has an extremely low probability of
occurring under the null hypothesis in the Gold Rush sce-
nario, and under any other similar Accumulation Bias set-
ting. The probability of reaching a certain study series
size t is much larger under any alternative hypothesis
when the power of the test for that alternative hypoth-
esis (1 − β) is larger than the type-I error α. Due to
this fact, it is possible to control an error rate if we as-
sume that a certain fraction of pilot studies (or topics, see
Table 3) pi are sampled from the alternative distribution
and a proportion (1 − pi) of pilot studies from the null.
This way, we are able to control the fraction of true rejec-
tions 1− P1
E (t)TYPE-II A (t), T ≥ t (complement of type-II
errors) to false rejections P0
E (t)TYPE-I A (t), T ≥ t.
posterior based on data, when the priors are determined independently
of the sample size, takes on the same value irrespective of the stopping
rule that gave rise to the observations (Hendriksen et al., 2018)
3To avoid any confusion, let us highlight that our likelihood-ratio
based tests are never equivalent to p-value based tests. While some p-
value based tests (such as the Neyman-Pearson most powerful test) can
be written as likelihood ratio tests, these are invariably of the form ‘re-
ject at significance level α if LR10(z1, . . . , zt )≥ γ where γ is chosen such
that P0( f1(z1, . . . , zt )/ f0(z1, . . . , zt ) ≥ γ) = α. In contrast, we choose γ
in a way that does not depend on knowledge of the tail area under P0
(e.g. in Section 7.2 we take γ = 1/α, and there the equality above is a
(strict) inequality).
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We can achieve such error control conditioned on time
— e.g. error control taking into account only t-study
meta-analyses — if we define thresholds based on the
Bayes posterior odds, which, by Bayes’ theorem, are given
by Opost (z1, . . . , zt) = LR10 (z1, . . . , zt) · pi1−pi . Remarkably,
these are not affected by the mechanism underlying the
decisions to continue studies or perform meta-analyses:
Opost
 
z1, . . . , zt
A (t), T ≥ t
:=
P

H1
 z1, . . . , zt ,A (t), T ≥ t
P [H0 | z1, . . . , zt ,A (t), T ≥ t]
=
f1
 
z1, . . . , zt ,A (t), T ≥ t
 ·pi
f0 (z1, . . . , zt ,A (t), T ≥ t) · (1−pi)
= LR10(t)
 
z1, . . . , zt ,A (t), T ≥ t
 · pi
1−pi
= LR10 (z1, . . . , zt) · pi1−pi
= Opost (z1, . . . , zt) .
(7.2)
We can set a threshold γ based on the rate of true to false
rejections, so γ = 16 would mean that we try to achieve
16 times as many true rejections than false rejections γ=
1−β
α , which is the the usual goal of a primary analysis with
intended power 1 − β = 0.8 and type-I error rate α =
0.05. To obtain error control, we need to specify the pre-
experimental rejection odds (Bayarri et al., 2016) γ · pi1−pi
and use these to threshold the posterior odds (Eq. (7.2)).
We define R to be the region of the sample space and R
the event for which Opost(z1, . . . , zt)≥ γ· pi1−pi , i.e. the event
that we reject, and obtain the following:
1− P1
E (t)TYPE-II A (t), T ≥ t
P0
E (t)TYPE-I A (t), T ≥ t
=
P1

Opost
 
Z1, . . . , Zt
A (t), T ≥ t≥ γ · pi1−pi
P0

Opost (Z1, . . . , Zt |A (t), T ≥ t)≥ γ · pi1−pi

=
P1

Opost(Z1, . . . , Zt)≥ γ · pi1−pi

P0

Opost(Z1, . . . , Zt)≥ γ · pi1−pi

=
P1[R]
P0[R] ≥
P1[R]
P1[R] · 1γ
= γ,
(7.3)
where the inequality follows since if
Opost
 
z1, . . . , zt
A (t), T ≥ t≥ γ · pi1−pi :
f1 (z1, . . . , zt)
f0 (z1, . . . , zt)
· pi
1−pi ≥ γ ·
pi
1−pi
then
f1 (z1, . . . , zt)
f0 (z1, . . . , zt)
≥ γ and
P0[R] =
∫
R
f0(z1, . . . , z2)≤
∫
R
f1(z1, . . . , z2)
γ
=
P1[R]
γ
.
(7.4)
So by specifying pi1−pi and an intended rate of true to false
rejections γ, we can calculate the posterior odds based on
the likelihood ratio, compare it to the threshold based on
γ and control fraction γ of type-I errors under the null hy-
pothesis. Note that anyA (t) is allowed, also multiple test-
ing in a series or selection for the most promising meta-
analysis timing. Setting a threshold to the Bayes posterior
odds as described above, achieves conditional error con-
trol under any form of Accumulation Bias.
7.2 Likelihood ratio’s error control surviving
over time
A likelihood ratio itself can be used as a test statistic to
obtain a procedure that controls P0[ETYPE-I] surviving over
analysis times t, as in Section 5.2. Suppose we simply
reject if the likelihood ratio in favor of the alternative is
larger than 1/α, ignoring any knowledge we might have
about the accumulation bias process and the prior odds.
We then find:
P0

there exists t ≤ T with E (t)TYPE-I andA (t)

= P0
∃t ≤ T : E (t)TYPE-I;A (t)
= P0

∃t ≤ T : LR10(t) (Z1, . . . , Zt)≥ 1
α
;A (t)

≤ P0

∃t > 0 : LR10(t) (Z1, . . . , Zt)≥ 1
α

≤ α.
(7.5)
The final inequality is a classic result, proofs of which
can be found in, for example, Robbins (1970); Shafer
et al. (2011) and (with substantial explanation) Hendrik-
sen et al. (2018); see also Royall (2000).
Thus, the type-I error control survives over time in the
sense that the P0-probability that we ever reject at a meta-
analysis time is bounded by α. To further illustrate and
interpret error control surviving over time, we define
F (t)TYPE-I = E (t)TYPE-I ∩E (t−1)TYPE-I,∩ . . .∩E (1)TYPE-I
as the event that the first type-I error E (t)TYPE-I in a series hap-
pens at time t (here E (t ′)
TYPE-I means ‘no type-I error at time
t ′). As we show in Appendix A.6, the previous inequality
implies that ∑
t
P0
F (t)TYPE-I,A (t), T ≥ t≤ α. (7.6)
The change in notation from E (t)TYPE-I to F (t)TYPE-I is necessary
since we want a general result for all forms of Accumula-
tion Bias and do not want to assume that the series stops
growing after the threshold is crossed (as is assumed in
living systematic reviews, see Section 4.3.4). But since it
is not possible to control the amount of errors if multi-
ple errors are made in the same series, we count only the
first error in Eq. (7.6). As such, we are able to control
the number of topics for which an error ever occurs in the
series by comparing the likelihood ratio to the threshold
1
α .
It may seem surprising that it is possible to obtain error
control in the sense of Eq. (7.6) for Accumulation Bias
scenarios like Gold Rush example. After all, in this exam-
ple large study series have only a large probability to oc-
cur if they contain many extreme (significant) results. So
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it seems that we would inevitably hit a type-I error once
we perform a meta-analysis. But note that in this exam-
ple, the expectation of A(t | Z1, . . . , Zt) (A0(t)) is much
larger for small t — due to the S(t) component — so that
most meta-analyses will be of small study series, or even
one-study series, with small type-I error rates. In terms of
Table 3, controlling error this way is possible because er-
ror control runs over all topics, regardless of the realized
series size. Thus, such error control is only meaningful
if the series for each topic are continuously monitored —
including those consisting of only pilot studies.
8 The choice between error control
conditioned and surviving over time
Many meta-analysts seem reluctant to apply living sys-
tematic review techniques to all meta-analyses. We be-
lieve that this reluctance can be defended based on the
assumed approach to error control surviving over time.
Surviving over time means that all possible analysis times
are weighted and that — in the long run —- a large pro-
portion of meta-analyses will be one-, two- and three-
study meta-analyses and never expand. To the occa-
sional meta-analyst, not involved in continuously up-
dating meta-analyses, two- or three-study meta-analyses
might never occur. Also, it requires a stretch of mind
to imagine one-study meta-analyses part of the long run
properties of your specific 15-study meta-analysis. But it
has been argued that “primary research is increasingly
viewed as part of a wider sequential process” (Higgins
et al., 2011, p. 918), or at least, that it should be (Lund
et al., 2016). Whether this approach to error control is
acceptable might also be very field specific. Among medi-
cal meta-analyses in the Cochrane Database of Systematic
Reviews, two- and three-study meta-analyses are common
(Davey et al., 2011), but in other fields meta-analyses
might only be performed if many more studies are avail-
able.
If, on the other hand, we want to stick to the conven-
tional conditional approach to meta-analysis, we need ad-
ditional assumptions on the fraction pi of true alternative
hypotheses among pilot studies to threshold the posterior
odds. Assuming a base rate pi means that we are essen-
tially Bayesian about the null and alternative hypothesis4,
but there is no need to be strictly Bayesian: in practice,
we might play around, and try best case and worst case
pi, to see how it affects our posterior odds. The important
thing for us to note within the context of this paper is that,
when concentrating on posterior odds, we can ignore all
details of the Accumulation Bias process and still obtain
meaningful results, in the form of error control that bal-
ances type-I and type-II errors.
Summarizing: If we prefer conditional error control, we
can obtain meaningful error control despite Accumula-
tion Bias if we use tests based on likelihood ratios, but
4We do not necessarily have to be completely Bayesian: even if the
null and/or alternative are composite, we can define “likelihood ratios”
that do not rely on prior guesses about the parameters within the models.
But we do need to be partially Bayesian, in the sense that we need to
specify a base rate for the null (Grünwald et al., 2019)
using prior odds for the base rates (and being partially
Bayesian) is then unavoidable. If we prefer not to rely
on any prior odds, we can still obtain meaningful error
control despite Accumulation Bias if we use tests based
on likelihood ratios, but then we have to resort to error
control surviving over time instead of conditional error
control.
The former, conditional approach balances type-I and
type-II errors and thus takes power into account. The im-
portance of taking power (the complement of a the type-II
error rate) into account has been argued before by many
(Simmonds et al., 2017). In the general approach to er-
ror control in individual studies, the expected type-I error
rate is fixed by the significance level α, and the type-II er-
ror rate minimized by the experimental design and sam-
ple size. In retrospective meta-analysis, however, sample
size (or study series size t) is not under the control of
the meta-analyst. Also, the study series size t is only a
snapshot of a possibly growing series (T ≥ t), since more
studies might be performed in the future. Therefore also
estimations of meta-analysis power are snapshots at a spe-
cific meta-analysis time. Nevertheless, it is often argued
that many meta-analyses are underpowered (Turner et al.,
2013; Davey et al., 2011) and that this should be taken
into account in evaluating significance in meta-analyses.
In Trial Sequential Analysis (Wetterslev et al., 2008) for
example, an alternative hypothesis is formulated to judge
the fraction of a required sample size available at t stud-
ies. A later review on trial sequential analysis noted:
statistical confidence intervals and significance
tests, relating exclusively to the null hypothe-
sis, ignore the necessity of a sufficiently large
number of observations to assess realistic or
minimally important intervention effects. –
Wetterslev, Jakobsen & Gluud (2017, p. 12)
Testing procedures based on likelihood ratios are very
well suited to take an alternative distribution with min-
imally important intervention effect into account. Espe-
cially when balancing type-I error and power by thresh-
olding posterior odds. Specifying power in tests without
fixed sample sizes is studied extensively in Grünwald et al.
(2019) and will be the focus of future research into like-
lihood ratios for meta-analysis.
9 Why likelihood ratios work: depen-
dencies as strategy
We calculate p-values to judge the extremeness of our re-
sults under the null hypothesis, and to control type-I er-
rors. But the p-value method is a fairly complicated ap-
proach to that goal when it comes to meta-analysis: To
obtain a valid p-value for a series of studies, the sampling
distribution under the null hypothesis needs to specify ex-
actly how the series and the meta-analysis timing came
about. Only for a completely and accurately specified pro-
cess can the extremeness of the data be judged and com-
pared to a threshold based on the tail area of the sampling
distribution.
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Fortunately, much simpler approaches to the same goal
can be found. One intuitive way is to consider a series of
bets s(Z1), s(Z2), . . . , s(Zt) against the null hypothesis that
make a profit when observed study results are extreme.
The more extreme the results, the larger the profit. The
bet needs to be designed in such a way that, under the
null hypothesis, no profit is to be expected. Each null re-
sult might costs $1 to play the bet, but in expectation also
makes a $1 profit:
E0[s(Zt)] = $1. (9.1)
Suppose that you start by investing $1 in the first bet.
After each study, you either decide to do a new study,
and reinvest all profit obtained so far, or to stop and cash
out. If you cash out after, for example, three studies, your
profit is s(Z1) · s(Z2) · s(Z3).
As long as Eq. (9.1) holds for each bet, you cannot expect
to profit under the null hypothesis; no matter what the
process is for deciding, based on past data, to continue
to new studies or to stop. This can be mathematically
proven using martingale theory, but intuitively the reason
is clear: The situation is entirely analogous to that in a
casino where you cannot expect to make a salary out of
playing — no matter how sophisticated the strategy you
use on the order of the games or when you want to play
or want to go home. Thus, irrespective of the rules used
for continuation and stopping, making a large profit casts
doubt on the null hypothesis even without knowledge of
the entire sampling distribution.
This idea of testing by betting is described in great de-
tail by Shafer and Vovk (2019), and Shafer et al. (2011)
show that a likelihood ratio is a beautiful way to specify
such bets. Briefly, if we set s(Zt) = f1(Zt)/ f0(Zt), then Eq.
(9.1) obviously holds:
E0

f1(Zt)
f0(Zt)

=
∫
z
f0(z)
f1(z)
f0(z)
dz =
∫
z
f1(z)dz = 1. (9.2)
Under this definition, s(z1) · . . . · s(zt) has two interpre-
tations: First, it is the joint likelihood ratio for the first
t studies. Second, it is the amount of profit made by se-
quentially reinvesting in a bet that is not expected to make
a profit under the null hypothesis.
So we can think of the meta-analyst acting at time t as
earning the profit specified by the likelihood ratio of the
data until the t-th study, and using that information to
advise on reinvestment in future studies. This procedure
will not lead to bankruptcy if the null hypothesis is true,
and will therefore allow you to keep reinvesting. If the
null hypothesis is not true, the better the focus of the bets
— determined by how close the alternative distribution
in the likelihood ratio is to the data-generating distribu-
tion — the larger the expected profit. The crucial point is
that every strategy is allowed, so also the ineffective ones
that produce research waste: also not taking into account
earlier studies is a strategy.
This interpretation — likelihood ratios as betting strate-
gies — explains how dependencies in the series relate to
the test statistic. Any Accumulation Bias process can be
considered a strategy to reinvest profit made so far, by de-
ciding on new studies (S(t)), or cashing out the current
profit (equivalent to performing a meta-analysis at time t
and advising against further studies: A (t), T = t). This
is the intuition behind the proof of results like Eq. (7.5)
and (7.6) — bounds on type-I error probability in meta-
analysis —- that can be derived without knowledge of the
Accumulation Bias process. These bounds simply express
that under the null, a large profit is unlikely under the null
no matter what the Accumulation Bias is.
it is always legitimate to continue betting, and
this makes each individual study a more infor-
mative element of a research program or a meta-
analysis – Shafer (2019, p. 2)
In contrast to an all-or-nothing test for one study, inspect-
ing the betting profit of a study is a way to test the data
without loosing the ability to build on it in future stud-
ies. The likelihood ratio has the ability to maximize the
rate of growth among all studies in a series, instead of the
power of a single p-value test on a prespecified series size
or stopping rule (Shafer, 2019). It allows for promising
but inconclusive initial studies and small study series to
be revisited in the light of new studies, but also to keep
track of the combined evidence at any time.
In this sense, the use of likelihood ratios in meta-analysis
is a statistical implementation of the goals of the Evidence
Based Research Network (Lund et al., 2016). Choosing
your bets wisely, by informing new studies by previous
results is just another betting strategy. You optimize what
studies to perform, and how to design and analyze them.
Implementing this rationale in the statistics allows to max-
imize the efficiency of future research and reduce research
waste (Chalmers and Glasziou, 2009).
9.1 Expanding likelihood ratios to Safe Tests
When the null hypothesis is simple, it can be shown that
either using bets that satisfy Eq. (9.1) under the null or
using likelihood ratios or using Bayes factors is equiva-
lent, and the gambling approach can be viewed as a form
of Bayesian inference. But for composite null (as in the t-
test scenario, with unknown variance σ2), the situation is
trickier: bets that satisfy Eq. (9.1) under all distributions
in the null hypotheses can still be constructed, but their
relation to likelihood ratios is more complicated. The pa-
per Safe Testing (Grünwald et al., 2019) investigates this
setting in great detail and shows that ‘error control sur-
viving over time’ (Section 7.2) can still be obtained for
general composite null.
10 Discussion
We need to consider time — study chronology and anal-
ysis timing — in meta-analysis. We need it because es-
timates are biased by Accumulation Bias when they as-
sume that a t-study series is a random sample from all
possible t-study series, while in fact dependencies arise
in accumulating science. We also need time because sam-
pling distributions are greatly affected by it, and the (p-
value) tail area approach to testing is very sensitive to the
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shape of the sampling distribution. And we need to con-
sider time because it allows for new approaches to error
control that recognize the accumulating nature of scien-
tific studies. Doing so also illustrates that available meta-
analysis methods — general meta-analysis and methods
for living systematic reviews — target two very different
approaches to type-I error control.
We believe that the exact scientific process that deter-
mines meta-analysis time can never be fully known, and
that approaches to error control need to be trustworthy re-
gardless of it. A likelihood ratio approach to testing solves
this problem and has even more appealing properties that
we will study in a forthcoming paper. Firstly, it agrees with
a form of the stopping rule principle (Berger and Berry,
1988). Secondly, it agrees with the Prequential principle
(Dawid, 1984). Thirdly, it allows for a betting interpreta-
tion (Shafer and Vovk, 2019; Shafer, 2019): reinvesting
profits from one study into the next and cashing out at
any time.
But this approach still leaves us with a choice: either as-
sume a prior probability pi and separate meta-analysis of
various sizes from each other and individual studies, or
control the type-I error rate over all analysis times t and
include individual studies in the meta-analysis world. The
first approach is more of a reflection of the current re-
ality in meta-analysis, while the second can be aligned
with the goals from the Evidence-Based Research Network
(Lund et al., 2016) and living systematic reviews (Sim-
monds et al., 2017).
Accumulation Bias itself might not need to be corrected
at all, which is why we want to close this paper with the
following quote:
the intuitive notion that bias is something bad
which must be corrected for, does not even fit
well within the frequentist framework. [...] one
could not state “use estimate X for a fixed sam-
ple size experiment, but use X − c(X ) (correct-
ing for bias) for a sequential experiment,” and
retain frequentist admissibility in the “real” sit-
uation where one encounters a variety of both
types of problems. The requirement of unbi-
asedness simply seems to have no justification.
–Berger & Berry (1988, p. 67)
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A Appendix
A.1 Common/fixed-effect meta-analysis
Here we derive Eq. (3.1a) and (3.1b), shown in (A.4), from the notation in (Borenstein et al., 2009), specifically for
the setting where means and standard deviations are reported in the study series Borenstein et al. (2009, Ch. 4 ). We
slightly adjusted the notation by using X T and X P instead of X 1 and X 2 to indicate the treatment and placebo group
estimate — to avoid confusion with the study numbering — and using Di instead of Di (Borenstein et al., 2009, p. 22)
or Yi (Borenstein et al., 2009, p. 66) as an analogy to the group study mean X i and we denote its standard deviation
as σDi . We introduce the superscript
(t) to emphasize a meta-analysis estimate of a series of studies 1 up to t.
Let Di = XTi − XPi be a random variable that denotes the difference between two observations (random or paired) from
the treatment group (XTi) and the placebo group (XPi) in study i. Let σˆDi be the estimate of the population standard
deviation of these difference scores in study i. Following the usual assumptions of common/fixed-effect meta-analysis,
no distinction is made between σˆDi and the true σDi (Borenstein et al., 2009, p. 264) and for simplicity, we assume
these standard deviations to be equal across studies:
For all i, j ∈ {1,2, . . . , t} σˆDi = σDi = σˆDj = σDj = σD (A.1)
Let Di = X Ti − X Pi be the estimated treatment effect in study i, i.e. the difference between the average effect in the
treatment group X Ti in study i and the average effect in the placebo group X Pi in study i. The population treatment
effect is denoted by ∆, and is the difference between the population mean effects in the two groups, ∆ = µT − µP
(Borenstein et al., 2009, p. 21). Let Zi =
Di
SEDi
be the treatment Z-score of study i that is standardized with regard to
the treatment effect standard error. Equation (A.2) displays the general definition of Z (t), the Z-score of the combined
effect estimated by a common/fixed-effect meta-analysis on studies 1 up to and including t (adapted notation from
Borenstein et al. (2009, p. 66)):
Z (t) =
M (t)
SEM (t)
M (t) =
∑t
i=1 Wi Di∑t
i=1 Wi
Wi =
1
SE2
Di
SEM (t) =
√√√ 1∑t
i=1 Wi
(A.2)
Let di =
Di
σD
be the Cohen’s d of the treatment score in study i (Borenstein et al., 2009, p. 26) — so standardized
with regard to the estimated population standard deviation — and let ni denote the sample size in the treatment and
placebo arm of study i (under the assumption that all studies have equal size study arms). Since SE2di =
1
ni
, we let
wi =
1
SE2di
= 11
ni
= ni denote the weights for di . Based on these weights, M (t) and SEM (t) can be expressed as follows,
using the fact that Di = diσD, SE2Di
= σ
2
D
ni
, and thus Wi = wi
1
σ2D
(see also Borenstein et al. (2009, p. 82)):
M (t) =
∑t
i=1 wi
1
σ2D
diσD∑t
i=1 wi
1
σ2D
=
∑t
i=1 widiσD∑t
i=1 wi
=
∑t
i=1 nidiσD∑t
i=1 ni
SEM (t) =
√√√ 1∑t
i=1 wi
1
σ2D
=
√√√ σ2D∑t
i=1 wi
=
√√√ σ2D∑t
i=1 ni
(A.3)
With N (t) =
∑t
i=1 ni and di =
Zip
ni
, the common/fixed-effect Z-score Z (t) of studies i up to and including t can be derived
as an average weighted by the square root of the individual study sample sizes:
Z (t) =
∑t
i=1 ni diσD
N (t)r
σ2D
N (t)
=
∑t
i=1 nidiq∑t
i=1 ni
=
∑t
i=1 ni
Zip
nip
N (t)
=
∑t
i=1
p
ni Zip
N (t)
=
∑t
i=1
p
nZip
t
p
n
=
1p
t
t∑
i=1
Zi for n1 = n2 = . . . = nt = n
(A.4)
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A.2 Expectation Gold Rush conditional pilot Z-score
Here, and in the following, we assume that there is always a first study (P [T ≥ 1] = 1).
E0 [Z1 | T ≥ 2] =
E0

Z1
 T ≥ 2, Z1 ≥ z α2  · P0 T ≥ 2  T ≥ 1, Z1 ≥ z α2  · P0 Z1 ≥ z α2 
P0 [T ≥ 2]
+
E0

Z1
 T ≥ 2, |Z1|< z α2  · P0 T ≥ 2  T ≥ 1, |Z1|< z α2  · P0 |Z1|< z α2 
P0 [T ≥ 2]
=
E0

Z1
 T ≥ 2, Z1 ≥ z α2  ·ω(1)S · α2 + E0 Z1  T ≥ 2, |Z1|< z α2  ·ω(1)NS · (1−α)
ω
(1)
S · α2 +ω(1)NS · (1−α)
(A.5)
since
P0 [T ≥ 2] = P0

T ≥ 2
 T ≥ 1, Z1 ≥ z α2  · P0 Z1 ≥ z α2 + P0 T ≥ 2  T ≥ 1, |Z1|< z α2  · P0 |Z1|< z α2 
=ω(1)
S
· α
2
+ω(1)
NS
· (1−α)
This expression only considers significant positive and nonsignificant results in the pilot study, since we defined in Eq.
(3.2) that significant negative results have 0 probability to produce replication studies. We can replace P0 by P in
the middle term of the fractions in the first two rows because new study probabilities are independent from the data
generating distribution, as discussed in Section 3.3.
A.3 Expectation Gold Rush conditional meta-analysis Z-score
For all t ≥ 2 :
E0

Z (t)
 T ≥ t=∑ti=1pni E0 [Zi | T ≥ t]p
N (t)
=
p
n1 E0 [Z1 | T ≥ t] +∑t−1i=2pni E0 [Zi | T ≥ t] +pnt E0 [Zt | T ≥ t]p
N (t)
=
p
n1 E0 [Z1 | T ≥ 2] +∑t−1i=2pni E0 [Zi | T ≥ i + 1]p
N (t)
(A.6)
Here we use that the last study in a series under the Gold Rush example is unbiased and has expectation 0 under the null
hypothesis. We also use that the expansion of the series beyond the next study does not influence a study’s expectation
in our Gold Rush example: for t ≥ 2 E0 [Z1 | T ≥ t] is the same as E0 [Z1 | T ≥ 2], and for any i and t ≥ i, E0 [Zi | T ≥ t]
is the same as E0 [Zi | i + 1]).
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A.4 Mixture variance
Var

Z (2)
 T ≥ 2	
=
α
2
·ω(1)
S
· E0
 
Z (2)
2  Z1 ≥ z α2 + (1−α) ·ω(1)NS · E0  Z (2)2  |Z1|< z α2 
−
α
2
·ω(1)
S
· E0

Z (2)
 Z1 ≥ z α2 + (1−α) ·ω(1)NS · E0 Z (2)  |Z1|< z α2 2
=
α
2
·ω(1)
S
·

Var
¦
Z (2)
 Z1 ≥ z α2 ©+ E0 Z (2)  Z1 ≥ z α2 2
+ (1−α) ·ω(1)
NS
·

Var
¦
Z (2)
 |Z1|> z α2 ©+ E0 Z (2)  Z1 ≥ z α2 2
−
α
2
·ω(1)
S
· E0

Z (2)
 Z1 ≥ z α2 + (1−α) ·ω(1)NS · E0 Z (2)  |Z1|< z α2 2
=
α
2
·ω(1)
S
·Var¦Z (2)  Z1 ≥ z α2 ©+ (1−α) ·ω(1)NS ·Var¦Z (2)  |Z1|> z α2 ©
+
α
2
·ω(1)
S
· E0

Z (2)
 Z1 ≥ z α2 2 + (1−α) ·ω(1)NS · E0 Z (2)  Z1 ≥ z α2 2 (A.7a)
−
α
2
·ω(1)
S
· E0

Z (2)
 Z1 ≥ z α2 + (1−α) ·ω(1)NS · E0 Z (2)  |Z1|< z α2 2 (A.7b)
Because squaring is a convex function, we know from Jensen’s Inequality that the average squared mean (A.7a) is larger
than the square of the average mean (A.7b). So the variance of the mixture is larger than the mixture of the variances.
A.5 Maximum time probability
The survival function S(t − 1) represents the probability P[T ≥ t]. The survival function is the complement of a cumu-
lative distribution function on maximum time or stopping times T, known in survival analysis as the lifetime distribution
function F(t − 1):
S(t − 1) = 1− F(t − 1)
with F(t − 1) =
t−1∑
i=0
P[T = i]
(A.8)
S(t − 1) = 1−
t−1∑
i=0
P[T = i]
S(t) = 1−
t−1∑
i=0
P[T = i]− P[T = t]
therefore: P[T = t] = S(t − 1)− S(t)
(A.9)
A.6 Error control surviving over time in terms of a sum
LetF ′(t)TYPE-I be the even that bothF (t) and T ≥ t holds. Using in the first equality below that the eventsF ′(1)TYPE-I,F ′(2)TYPE-I, . . .
are all mutually exclusive (so that the union bound becomes an equality), we get:∑
t
P0
F (t)TYPE-I,A (t), T ≥ t≤∑
t
P0
F (t)TYPE-I, T ≥ t
= P0
∃t > 0 : F (t)TYPE-I, T ≥ t
≤ P0
∃t > 0 : F (t)TYPE-I
= P0
∃t > 0 : E (t)TYPE-I
= P0

∃t > 0 : LR10(t) (Z1, . . . , Zt)≥ 1
α

≤ α
where the final inequality is just the final inequality of (7.5) again. (7.6) follows.
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A.7 Code availability
Table 1, Figure 1 and Table 2 were calculated, simulated and created by R code available in the EASY-DANS repository:
https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-x56-qfme (see Extended data(Schure, 2019))
Details on the OS and version at which it were run can be found below:
• Platform: x86 64-redhat-linux-gnu
• Arch: x86 64
• OS: linux-gnu
• System: x86 64, linux-gnu
• R version: 3.5.3 (2019-03-11) Great Truth
• svn rev: 76217
The following packages were used:
• ggplot2 version 3.0.0
• graphics version 3.5.3
• grDevices version 3.5.3
• methods version 3.5.3
• stats version 3.5.3
• utils version 3.5.3
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